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The mereological problem of entanglement concerns the question which
objects there are on the micro and macro level, when a system is in an
entangled state, and which of the objects carries which properties. This pa-
per proceeds from a recent taxonomy of the possible mereological models
for entangled systems and systematically discusses which of them is com-
patible with the quantum mechanical evidence. It reveals that entangled
quantum systems neither describe undivided wholes nor objects that stand
in irreducible relations. The appropriate model assumes that the entangled
property is an irreducible non-relational plural property carried collectively
by the micro objects while there is no macro object.
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1 Introduction
The peculiar features of entangled quantum systems (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen
1935; Schrödinger 1935) pose at least four philosophical puzzles: a spatio-temporal prob-
lem,1 a problem for individuation,2 a causal problem,3 and a mereological problem. The
latter is at present the least developed of the four riddles. It concerns the question which
objects there are, when a system is in an entangled state, which of them stand in the
parthood relation, and, if one understands the problem in a wider sense, also which of
them carries which properties, especially the entangled property. This paper aims at a
precise formulation and at solving this mereological puzzle of entanglement.
On the one hand, the problem does not seem unfamiliar: Due to some kind of holism
that entangled quantum states exhibit (e.g. Esfeld 2001, also Bohm and Hiley 1993), it
has long been conjectured that also the mereological features of such systems might be
unusual. There are two widespread main ideas: One is that entangled states describe
intrinsic properties of undivided wholes, while a rival conception assumes that they
refer to irreducible entanglement relations between micro objects (“relational holism”;
Teller 1986). What kind of holism exactly do we have and what does it imply for the
involved objects? Often, in this early debate about the mereology of entanglement,
the focus has been on the irreducible entangled property, whereas the implications for
the objects and their mereological relations have been treated en passant ; accordingly
the mereological conclusions tend to rest on imprecise concepts, intuitive inferences and
implicit assumptions.
1 Non-locality or backwards causation? Bell 1964, Maudlin 1994.
2 Non-individuals or weak discernibility? Redhead and Teller 1992, Saunders 2006.
3 Causally unexplained correlations or causal unfaithfulness? Näger 2016.
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Only in recent years philosophers have started to apply the precise concepts, princi-
ples and positions of mereology to the quantum realm, putting the question for the
objects and their mereological relations to the center of interest and on solid grounds.
This includes both applying the formal theory of parts and wholes (classical extensional
mereology)4 as well as considering the positions of the qualitative, metaphysical debate
(initiated by Inwagen 1990). It seems that in the discussion among mereologists the
dominant view is that the irreducible entangled state requires the existence of a macro
object (Schaffer 2010; Calosi and Tarozzi 2014; Calosi and Morganti 2016), which can
either have parts or not. In contrast, Bohn (2012) and Brenner (2018) argue that en-
tangled systems need not require the existence of a macro object since the irreducible
entangled property can be carried collectively by the micro objects.
The claim of collectively carried properties makes clear that the inference from prop-
erties to the existence of objects, which is at the heart of the mereological problem of
entanglement, is not straightforward. In particular, it reveals that arguments for the
existence of a macro object that do not explicitly rule out collective properties might
have been to hasty. On the other hand, neither Bohn nor Brenner provide evidence from
the quantum mechanical formalism why to believe in their proposal.
In this paper I shall examine the quantum mechanical evidence for and against possible
solutions to the mereological problem in a systematic way. I start (section 2) from a
recent comprehensive survey of the mereological models that are available for entangled
systems (Näger and Strobach, 2020) and proceed to approach an appropriate model by
ruling out all others. I first discard certain obvious but inappropriate strategies for this
task (section 3), before I present reliable arguments that are based on evidence from
quantum mechanics (sections 4–6). The aim is to justify the choice of the mereological
model by the best scientific theory that we have of the phenomenon.
My arguments aim to show that quantum mechanics speaks against modeling entangled
systems as objects that stand in irreducible relations (sections 4) as well as against
understanding them as undivided wholes (section 5); it even speaks against assuming
a macro object in addition to the micro objects (section 6). My somewhat surprising
result then will be that quantum theory suggests a model along the ideas of Bohn that
the entangled property is an irreducible non-relational plural property carried by the
micro objects while there is no macro object.5
2 Possible models
2.1 Systems, levels and ontology
The most simple systems that are capable of having an entangled state are so called “two-
particle systems”, say, a system of two electrons. There are two levels of description: On
4 Tarski 1929; Leonard and Goodman 1940; Simons 1987
5 Brenner’s idea is similar, but he assumes that the plural property is relational, which turns out to
be in conflict with the quantum mechanical description.
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the micro level one considers each one-particle system (“micro system”) in itself while on
the macro level one considers the two-particle system (“macro system”) as a whole. So
the distinction “micro” vs. “macro” here is a relative rather than an absolute one, and
especially “macro system” does not denote systems of perceptible size (of the magnitude
of 1023 objects). However, much of what I say about the macro system can easily
be generalized to n-particle systems (with n ≥ 2), insofar these systems are correctly
described by quantum mechanics.6
I take “system” to be a concept on the epistemic level which is ontologically neutral:
Talk about a system does not imply that there is an object corresponding to the system.
Especially, the fact that there is a micro-level description and a macro-level description
does not per se imply that the micro objects or the macro object must exist. It will be a
central part of our below discussion which features the descriptions must have in order
to provide evidence for or against the existence of the corresponding objects.
I denote the possibly existing disjunct objects corresponding to the one-particle systems
as a and b, respectively (the single electrons, the “micro objects”), and the possibly
existing object corresponding to the two-particle system as c (the “macro object”). Since
a and b have the same role, I consider only models according to which either both a and
b exists or none.
When a and b are of the same kind (e.g. electrons), quantum mechanics requires a
certain (anti-)symmetry of their states.7 The micro objects of such systems have been
interpreted to be either non-individuals or to only have weak identity (individuational
problem of entanglement, see Footnote 2), which poses two problems: First, this seems to
mingle the mereological problem at hand with the individuational problem. Second, non-
individuals and weakly identical objects would not be suited to be described by classical
mereology, which is based on first order predicate logic and therefore presupposes that
objects can be given names. In order to avoid both problems in this paper, I just mimic
quantum mechanics’ strategy to deal with such states: I refer to them by usual names
and require symmetry of properties, i.e. that a has a certain property if and only if b
has that property.8 While our pretension of being able to attach names should not be
interpreted literally, the symmetrization blurs the inappropriately strong assumptions
such that our results should be compatible with different solutions of the individuational
problem, which then can be neglected here and tackled separately.
Note that also “particle” is meant to be an ontologically neutral concept: To say that
there is an object corresponding to a one-particle system is not to say that the object is a
tiny billiard ball; and to say that there is an object corresponding to a two-particle system
neither implies that there are two separate objects.9 In order to avoid these misleading
6 It is an empirical question and I leave it open here whether the generalization includes systems with
a size of even 1023 particles.
7 Symmetry for bosons, antisymmetry for fermions.
8 Quantum mechanics describes macro states as composed of micro states, labels the micro states by
unique indices and then requires to (anti-)symmetrize the macro state.
9 “Two-particle system” rather refers to the facts that the system’s state space is in a non-trivial sense
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Figure 1: Possible mereological models for a quantum mechanical two-particle system.
Blobs represent existing objects, dotted arrows denote the is-part-of relation.
associations, I shall mostly speak of micro and macro systems in the following rather
than of one- and two-particle systems.
2.2 Mereological models
Any mereological model must answer two questions:
(i) Which objects are there?
(ii) Which of the existing objects stand in the is-part-of relation?
Consider again a two-particle quantum system. By what we have said in Section 2.1,
there are three possible mereological models for such a system (Figure 1). While the
models RMM1 and RMM2 are radical in the sense that only the macro object or the
micro objects exist, respectively, MMM is moderate in that it assumes the existence of
objects on both levels such that the following claims are true: each a and b, respectively,
is a part of c; c is the mereological sum of a and b; a and b compose c.
Examining the existence of objects (and below whether instances of properties exist) it
is important to distinguish the following cases (where X is some entity):
1. X exists and its existence does not depend on other entities (fundamental
existence, strong ontological realism).
2. X exists and its existence depends on other entities (dependent existence,
weak ontological realism).
3. X does not exist but there is a paraphrase for X such that “X exists” is true
given the paraphrase (reductive existence; ontological reductionism).
4. X does not exist and there is no sensible paraphrase that would make “X exists”
true (non-existence; ontological eliminativism).
composed of the state spaces of two one-particle systems and that when measuring at the system,
one finds two localized objects (“particles”), which, however, is compatible with the fact that before
measurement there was only one macro object.
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Let us agree here that when a mereological model claims the existence of an object it
means fundamental or dependent existence.10 Especially, if an object exists only reduc-
tively, it is not noted in our mereological models. Mereological nihilism, for instance,
would only assume the existence of mereological atoms in its models since according
to the position non-trivial composite objects like tables do not exist in a fundamental
or dependent, but only in a reductive sense: “tables exist” is true by the paraphrase
“table-wise arranged atoms exist”. I further emphasize that to require composite objects
to exist fundamentally or dependently excludes composition as identity,11 since identity
clearly amounts to reductive existence. While this assumption is not shared by all mere-
ologists,12 I think it is justified by the fact that it provides the concept of composition
with a substantive ontological content: To say that there is a mereological sum, then
means that there is a further object that is distinct from the parts. Hence, when I talk
about existence simpliciter in the following I always mean fundamental or dependent
existence.
Note further that usual mereological models only indicate parthood relations but not
which of the objects exist fundamentally and which dependently. Model MMM, for
instance, does not tell whether a and b are fundamental or whether c is. While the
natural assumption is that parts are more fundamental than the objects they compose,
this thesis has been attacked in the quantum realm: Schaffer (2010) claims that entangled
quantum wholes are more fundamental than their parts. In the following I understand
mereological models to be neutral concerning this question, if not enhanced by further
assumptions.
2.3 Part-property models for entangled systems
I shall now extend the mereological models to include properties. This is a natural thing
to do since the main reason why we assume the existence of objects is for them to carry
properties, and it is the properties that seem to be unusual according to the quantum
mechanical description.
Quantum states, properties, bearers
In quantum theory, properties are described by states. Similar to the concept “system” I
understand “state of a system” as a concept on an epistemic level which is ontologically
neutral:13 It aims at describing properties but does not per se imply that in fact there is
10 I.e. existence inside the “ontology room” (Van Inwagen, 2014, p. 1).
11 While there are different varieties of the view labelled “composition as identity”, I take it that they
all commit to the following claim: If the xs compose y, then y is identical to the xs. (Wallace, 2011;
Calosi, 2016b)
12 Calosi (2016a; 2016b) derives some interesting consequences of composition as identity.
13 Note that this is not to assume an epistemic interpretation of quantum states (which holds that the
state of a system describes our state of knowledge about a system, such that changes in state are
changes in our knowledge). The neutral concept of “system” I have in mind here is both compatible
with realist and anti-realist readings of quantum states.
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a corresponding property instance. In this sense, the relation between states and prop-
erties resembles that between predicates and properties. Whether there are properties
corresponding to certain states, will be a central topic of our subsequent discussion.
A “micro state” is the state of one micro system and does not refer to other systems;
a “macro state”, in contrast, is the state of a macro system comprising several micro
systems.
In this paper we assume a realist understanding of quantum theory. One central tenet
of such interpretations is
(QSR) Quantum state realism: Each fundamental quantum state of a suitable quan-
tum model appropriately describes a property instance.
Fundamental states are those that are required to derive all other states according to the
theory in a given model. Consider, for instance, a spin state of a two-particle quantum
system that is in product form,
|ψ〉12 = |↑〉1|↓〉2 (1)
(“| ↑〉1” means that particle 1 has spin direction up, and “| ↓〉2” ascribes spin direction
down to particle 2.) Since the tensor product is the rule of composition in quantum
theory, in this case the macro state |ψ〉12 is separable into the micro states | ↑〉1 and
| ↓〉2. Then, the micro states are fundamental, whereas the macro state can be derived
as the tensor product of the micro states. Consequently, the realist is committed to the
claim that there is a property instance described by |↑〉1 and one described by |↓〉2, but
she should not assume the existence of a property instance that corresponds to |ψ〉12.
The latter exists only reductively and its existence can be paraphrased by referring to
the instances described by |↑〉1 and |↓〉2.
Besides having product form, the states of quantum macro systems can be entangled.
One of the simplest examples is the Bell singlet state,14 describing again the spin direc-








In contrast to (1), an entangled state like the Bell singlet state neither has product form
(it is an equally weighted sum of two product states), nor can it be rewritten in product
form.15,16 Since, as we have just said, the tensor product is the condition of separability
in quantum theory, this implies that the entangled state cannot be separated into micro
states; it is a non-separable macro state. This moreover implies:
14 In this exposition we presuppose that quantum states are rays in Hilbert space (“ray view”). Only
later we generalize our arguments to the alternative view that quantum states are statistical operators
in Hilbert space (“statistical operator view”).
15 Precisely: There is no basis relative to which the entangled state can be written as a tensor product
|ψ〉12 6= |ψ〉1 ⊗ |ψ〉2 of states from its subspaces, |ψi〉 ∈ Hi and H12 = H1 ⊗H2.
16 Measuring at a system that is in this state yields in 50% of the cases that particle 1 is spin up and
particle 2 is spin down, while in 50% of the cases particle 1 is spin down and particle 2 is spin up. This
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(¬DMi) No well-defined micro states: The micro systems do not have a well-defined
spin micro state.
And consequently:
(Irr) Irreducibility: An entangled state is not reducible to the micro states.17
Entangled states being irreducible, non-separable macro states constitutes well-known
quantum holism. Since in this way, entangled states are fundamental, a realist interpre-
tation of quantum theory needs to assume that there is a property instance described
by the entangled state.
Concerning existing property instances we further require:
(EPB) Existence of property bearers:18 For every existing property instance there
is an object that carries it, or there are several objects that carry it collectively.
By this plausible principle the property instance described by the entangled quantum
state needs an object that carries it. Then, two central questions emerge:
(iii) Of which arity is the irreducible entangled property?
(iv) Which object(s) bear the irreducible entangled property?
Six models
There are three main answers to these two questions, each of which comes in two variants.
Näger and Strobach (2020) have argued that these six part-property models exhaust the
conceivable options:
First, the property P described by the entangled quantum state might be carried by
the macro object c corresponding to the two-particle system, so P is a monadic singular
macro property and Pc holds. We call this scenario “monistic holism”. Requiring the
existence of the macro object, monistic holism is compatible with the mereological models
RMM1 and MMM, so it comes in two variants: The radical variant, assuming RMM1,
says that the macro object c is the only existing object, i.e. it is an undivided whole
(“radical monistic holism”, RMH, figure 2a) in the sense that it is a macro object that
does not have parts. Since it is spatially extended and partless, it is an extended simple
(cf. Simons 1987). The moderate version, assuming MMM, claims that besides c the
two micro objects a and b exist as well (“moderate monistic holism”, MMH, figure 2b;
Schaffer (2010); Calosi and Tarozzi 2014; Calosi and Morganti 2016).
correlation of the measurement outcomes is well-known to hold also under space-like separation of the
two measurements, yielding empirical evidence for famous quantum non-locality and the associated
spatio-temporal problem of entanglement.
17 Note that the failure of micro-reduction does not rest on an incommensurability of concepts (since
both levels are described by the same theory) nor on an epistemic shortcoming (since one can prove
mathematically that there is no product form of the entangled state).
18 Cf. Calosi and Tarozzi’s (2014, 70) instantiation principle.
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(a) Radical monistic holism (RMH)
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(f) Moderate pluralistic holism (MPH)
Figure 2: The possible part-property models for a two-particle entangled system
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Second, the entangled state might describe a property that is carried collectively by
the two particles. Since we have said above that non-separable states count as macro
states this scenario claims that several micro objects collectively carry a macro property.
The most straightforward way is to think of the entangled property as an irreducible
relational property R holding between a and b (“relational holism”; Teller 1986, 1989;
Esfeld 2004). Presupposing the existence of the micro objects, this scenario is compatible
with mereological models RMM2 and MMM, yielding either the model radical relational
holism (RRH, figure 2c, Brenner 2018), which assumes that only a and b exist, or the
model moderate relational holism (MRH, figure 2d), which additionally assumes the
existence of the macro object c.
There is a third option, introduced to the debate by Bohn (2012), that is easily overlooked
and that is another form of collective attribution. The idea is that a macro property
that is collectively carried by the micro objects might be a non-relational plural property
P col.19 The idea can be explained as follows. Similar to relational properties, which are
plural properties, P col is plural as well in that it is jointly carried by several objects;
by contrast, P col is a non-relational feature of the objects taken collectively. Compare:
“Five dogs surround a cat” refers to a relational plural property (since it is a statement
about the spatial relations between the dogs and the cat), while “having temperature
12 °C” refers to a non-relational plural property (since temperature is proportional to
the mean kinetic energy of the atoms of the system, it is carried by all atoms collectively;
but temperature is not relational).20,21
While temperature reduces to the micro properties, the idea in the present proposal
is that the entangled property is an irreducible non-relational plural property. This
position, which I call “pluralistic holism”, again comes in two variants, depending on
which mereological model one presumes. Starting from RMM2, which assumes that
only the micro objects exist, yields the model radical pluralistic holism (RPH, figure 2e,
Bohn 2012), whereas presupposing MMM, which additionally involves the macro object,
yields the model moderate pluralistic holism (MPH, figure 2f).
The overview of possible model reveals the following important fact:
(MaPB) Macro property bearing: A macro property can be borne either by a macro
object (as a singular property) or by several micro objects collectively (as a
plural property, either relational or non-relational).
This insight blocks direct inferences from the existence of an irreducible macro property
to the existence of the corresponding macro object. For this reason, property holism
19 For the plural logic underlying collective predication see Oliver and Smiley 2016.
20 Generally, any mean property of micro properties seems to be a non-relational plural property.
21 I caution that for many cases there is a gap between predicates and properties in that a predicate
being monadic plural does not imply that the denoted property is monadic plural. There are plenty
of monadic plural predicates, like “writing a book together”, “jointly carrying the sofa” or “dancing
tango”, that syntactically require a single subject (hence monadic) and the subject needs to denote
several things (hence plural). Nevertheless, the properties referred to by these predicates typically
are complex relational properties, i.e. they are not monadic plural properties.
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does not per se imply object holism; the option of collective properties in some sense
decouples the two questions.
Since there are good reasons that the overview of the six models is exhaustive, one of
these models must be true. In this way, the taxonomy of six models gives the mereological
problem of entanglement a precise from. In the following we shall investigate which of
the models is the most appropriate one. The overview of six models serves as a basis for
our considerations in that we shall try to find arguments that exclude certain models.
3 Inconclusive strategies
3.1 Main mereological positions
One could try to rule certain models out by bringing in more mereological assumptions,
e.g. to assume one of the main mereological positions (universalism, nihilism, moder-
ate compositionalism). This strategy restricts the models to some extent, but it does
not yield a unique result for any of the positions: Universalism, holding that any num-
ber of objects have a sum, excludes RRH and RPH; nihilism, which forbids non-trivial
composition, is incompatible with the moderate positions; and moderate compositional-
ism, assuming that composition occurs under certain circumstances, excludes RRH and
RPH, if entangled systems fulfill the circumstances (e.g. because composition is among
the sufficient conditions for composition), or excludes the moderate models, if entangled
systems do not fulfill the conditions.22
We shall, however, not make use of any of these restrictions in the following, because
that would require to have independent reasons for the presumed position. The idea
of this paper rather is to look at the evidence that the quantum mechanical formalism
provides for restricting the models.
3.2 Variable vs fixed arities
Schaffer (2010; cf. also Calosi and Tarozzi 2014) have argued that monism, assuming
intrinsic monadic macro properties, has the advantage over relationalism that it can
ascribe a spin macro property, say “spin 0”, to systems with any number of components,
while relationalism needs to assume a distinct spin property for each number of compo-
nents. Brenner (2018) has replied that relationalists do not need to build their positions
on n-place relations, which require a fixed number of objects that bear it, but can assume
multigrade relations, which can be carried by a variable number of objects. Likewise,
Bohn (2012, p. 219) has remarked that non-relational plural properties typically can be
had by a variable number of objects as well.23 So against first appearances there does
22 Interestingly, RMH is the position that all three positions could agree on, which, however, is not to
say that it is the most appropriate one.
23 Though his example “being classmates” rather seems to be a relational property; but his claim is
clearly true for more paradigmatic examples of non-relational plural properties like average quantities.
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not seem to be a crucial difference among the models concerning this question: One can
understand either of them as involving a property with a variable number of components.
On the other hand, presupposing realism concerning fundamental quantum states, the
most basic properties we are concerned with here are not properties like “having macro
spin 0” but rather entangled quantum states like the singlet state (2). Such states, how-
ever, typically involve a fixed number of numeric labels,24 two in the case of the singlet
state, which in some sense indicate the number of involved micro objects: in the case of
relationalism and pluralism the number of labels indicates the number of actual micro
objects that carry the entangled property; in the case of MMH the number of labels cor-
respond to the number of actual micro objects that, however, do not carry the entangled
spin property (the macro object does); and in the case of RMH, according to which no
micro objects exist when entanglement holds, the number of labels is best understood
as the number of micro objects the system can decompose into at measurement. In any
case, the number of labels is crucial for the entangled state since it makes a notable
difference whether one has an entangled state with e.g. two labels or eight labels, even if
both imply the same total spin. For this reason I think that it seems more appropriate
to assume that the quantum states we are concerned with here (from non-relativistic
quantum mechanics) require a fixed numbers of objects.
This again is compatible with all three basic positions: The monist needs to assume that
her monadic singular properties are internally structured in a way that corresponds to
the fixed number of labels, the relationalist just assumes well-known n-place relations,
and the pluralist considers plural properties that require a fixed number of objects.
Of course, in relativistic quantum physics we also have the case that the particle number
can change depending on the reference frame (Unruh effect), and in quantum field theory
we even have states that do not fix a certain number of particles relative to the same
frame. In such cases, the fact that all models can allow for properties with variable
numbers, might help (cf. Bohn, 2012, p. 219).
In sum, the idea to make a case for the one or the other model on the basis of the
different arities of the properties does not seem to be conclusive.
3.3 Light-weight interpretation of quantum states
Ray view vs statistical operator view
There are two basic views of what quantum states are: states of quantum systems
are either represented by rays in Hilbert space (“ray view”) or by statistical operators
(“statistical operator view”). So far we have discussed entanglement on the basis of
the ray view: The entangled state noted in equation (2) is a vector in Hilbert space,
determining a ray in Hilbert space. Concerning the most central features of entangled
24 In quantum field theory there are also states that do not fix a certain number of particles.
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states, however, the two views agree (Maudlin 1998): Entangled states are well-defined
and they are not reducible to the micro states (Irr).
The two views differ, however, concerning the status of the micro states, and conse-
quently concerning the justification of (Irr). It is only according to the ray view that the
micro states are not well-defined: The failure to form a product of micro states implies
that the entangled state is not a ray in the Hilbert spaces of the micro systems and, con-
sequently, by the ray view, the micro states are not well-defined (¬DMi). Hence, (Irr)
holds because there are no micro states from which the macro state could be derived.
The statistical operator view, in contrast, does assign a statistical operator to each micro
system,25 so there are well-defined micro states. Here, (Irr) holds because one cannot
derive the entangled macro state from the micro states: Each micro state only allows
to predict the statistics of experiments with the corresponding micro system, but it is
silent about the correlations between the micro system at hand and the respective other
micro system(s); only the macro state allows to predict these correlations.
In sum, the ray view says that the entangled macro state is well-defined, but the micro
states are not, while the statistical operator view holds that both the entangled macro
and the micro states are well-defined.
Intuitive inference?
There might be some intuitive appeal in inferring that the ray view favors a model ac-
cording to which only the macro object exists and carries the entangled quantum state
(RMH), while the statistical operator view requires the corresponding moderate variant
(MMH), which additionally assumes the existence of the micro objects. If this procedure
were reliable, one would have a fast-track to deciding the question of the appropriate
model, based solely on a light-weight interpretation of the quantum mechanical formal-
ism. The only question then would be to decide between RV and SOV.
The naturally seeming inference, however, must involve hidden assumptions, as one infers
from the well-definiteness of states to the existence of objects. A straightforward (though
probably not the only) way to formulate these assumptions is the following principle:
(SBP) Strong bridge principle: If and only if the state of a quantum system on
level l is well-defined, the corresponding object on level l exists.
Reference to the level here secures that if and only if the state of a macro system is
well-defined, the corresponding macro object exists; and if and only if the state of a
micro system is well-defined, the corresponding micro object exists. While so far we
have only considered spin states of quantum systems, the state of a quantum system
here means the complete state of such systems, i.e. the spin state as well as the position
state. It does not mean the state-independent properties such as mass, charge, total spin
(more on these in section 5). The principle then says that if and only if both position
25 The statistical operator for the micro systems is the respective reduced operator.
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and spin states are well-defined, a corresponding object exists. So in case the spin state
of a system fails to be well-defined, the corresponding object does not exist.
Isn’t this principle natural? Maybe. More importantly, however, it is a heavy-weight
and complex metaphysical principle whose status is not immediately clear; it needs
justification. The straightforward way to infer from a light-weight interpretation of the
formalism to the appropriate mereological model, is blocked. If the inference is to be
justified, we cannot avoid deep metaphysical considerations. So let us now consider
whether the principle is in fact justified.
3.4 The strong bridge principle
Is the strong bridge principle justified? I think it is not. Let me shortly illustrate this
for the direction of inference from the states to the objects.
Suppose we have a macro system in a product state, i.e. a non-fundamental state.
The state is well-defined, so by the (SBP) the corresponding macro object exists. But
why assume that? We have made clear above that realism is only committed to as-
sume that fundamental states describe property instances because property described
by non-fundamental states can be reduced to the property instances described by the
fundamental states. Assuming property instances that are reducible to more fundamen-
tal ones would contradict Ockham’s principle. So why assume l-level objects if there are
no l-level properties?
One might then be inclined to restrict the principle to fundamental states:
(SBP’) Strong bridge principle’: If and only if the state of a quantum system on level
l is well-defined and fundamental, the corresponding object on level l exists.
By this principle, there is only one level of objects, namely the one that correspond to
the level of fundamental states. In the case of entangled systems this would be the macro
object, and the micro objects would not exist, not even if one presumes the SOV.
The crucial problem, however, is that from the fact that there is an l-level property,
even if the property is fundamental, it does not follow that there is an l-level object.
As l-level properties can be carried collectively by l-1-level objects (MaPB), one cannot
infer from the existence of a property instance on level l to the existence of an object on
level l without further information.
In sum, deriving mereological consequences on the basis of the (SBP) (or the (SBP’))
is not justified. A straightforward, “intuitive” interpretation of the RV as well as of
the SOV fails. We now need to turn to arguments that are based on more appropriate
principles. Rather than formulating one principle that rules out all but one model, we
shall collect different small pieces of evidence from the quantum mechanical formalism
that yields several separate arguments against different models.
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4 Against a relational entangled property
4.1 Non-relative relational properties
Relational holism (models RRH and MRH) claims that the entangled property is an
irreducible relation. According to this view, the singlet state (2) can be understood
relationally in the following sense: Object a has opposite spin to object b. The relation
being irreducible means that there are no micro properties to which the relation reduces
as, for instance, “Alice being 5 cm taller than Mary” reduces to “Mary being 1.68 m tall”
and “Alice being 1.73 m tall”. We have just the relation and the micro properties are
either not defined at all (RV) or they are defined but do not allow to derive the relation
(SOV).
The features of systems in the singlet state provide no evidence against (and rather
some evidence for) the case that it describes a relational property. We here first need to
be explicit about these features in order to understand their failure for other entangled
states, which then provide evidence against a relational property. Discussing the features
of entangled states one can either argue on the theoretical level (regarding the structure
of the states and their dispositions for yielding certain measurement results) or on on
the empirical level (discussing the statistics resulting from measurements at such states).
Here we take the latter route and present the results of spin measurements at a system
in the singlet state:
• |↑〉1 and |↓〉226 in 50%27 of the cases,
• |↓〉1 and |↑〉2 in 50% of the cases,
• and this statistics holds for any measurement direction.
These results fulfill four general features that are necessary conditions for an irreducible
relational spin macro property before measurement:
(i) There is a rotational symmetry of the measurement results. (“Having opposite
spin to” does not prefer any direction.)
(ii) The micro properties (after measurement) vary from run to run. (“Having
opposite spin to” does not determine which spin direction a particle in itself
has; a well-defined spin direction can only be determined at measurement when
the entangled state collapses.)
(iii) The different possible outcomes are statistically equally distributed. (“Having
opposite spin to” does not prefer any of the possible outcomes.)
(iv) In all measurement runs the measured micro properties either (a) have opposite
spin or (b) they have equal spin. (“Having opposite spin to” requires that the
spins are opposite, while “having equal spin to” requires that the spins agree.)
26 Read: object 1 has spin up and object 2 has spin down.
27 The probability that a certain combination of micro properties emerges at measurement is given
by the square of the factor that appears in the corresponding term in the entangled state (before
measurement), e.g. (1/
√
2)2 = 50% for the result |↑〉1 and |↓〉2.
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I should mention that the conditions summarized here hold for spin properties under-
stood as non-relative relational properties (the relative notion is a generalization which
we shall explain in the subsequent Section 4.2).








has the following similar but different measurement statistics,
• |↑〉1 and |↑〉2 in 50% of the runs,
• |↓〉1 and |↓〉2 in 50% of the runs,
• and this statistics holds for any measurement direction.
and therefore fulfills (i)–(iii) and (ivb), providing some evidence that it describes the
property “having the same spin direction as”.
4.2 Relative relational properties and superpositions thereof
The singlet state (and its counterpart), however, are special cases of entanglement in
many ways, and when one considers less special cases the idea of a relational property








State (4) looks similar to the singlet state, and the statistics is similar but with a crucial
difference:
• |↑〉1 and |↓〉2 in 50% of the cases,
• |↓〉1 and |↑〉2 in 50% of the cases,
• and this statistics only holds for one measurement direction and changes for dif-
ferent directions to:28
– |↑〉1 and |↓〉2 in a fraction p1 of the runs,
– |↓〉1 and |↑〉2 in a fraction p1 of the runs.
– |↑〉1 and |↑〉2 in a fraction 12 − p1 of the runs,
– |↓〉1 and |↓〉2 in a fraction 12 − p1 of the runs,














and p1 is a function of the rotation angle.
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where 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 12 . Hence, here two of the above mentioned necessary conditions for a
relational property are violated, namely that there is a rotational symmetry (i) and that
all possible outcomes are either opposite or equal spins (iv). While this seems to speak
against a relational property, I shall now demonstrate how one can push the concept of a
relational property such that even this case might be covered. (Note that I do not defend
the following proposal, I just want to show here how far one can stretch the concept of
a relation in order to subsequently make clear where the conflict really lies.)
In requiring the condition of rotational symmetry we have implicitly assumed, as might
seem natural, that the relational property does not prefer any direction of space, such as
for relations of spatial distance between two objects. The rotational symmetry, however,
does not hold generally for relations, it is, for instance, not true of relational properties
that hold relative to a spatial direction. An example might be the relation “is larger in
extension”: Alice might be larger in extension than Mary in vertical direction, but Mary
might be larger in extension than Alice in horizontal direction. If one accepts that the
macro spin direction is a relative relational property, the spin property could change
in dependence of the measurement direction, violating rotational symmetry. Hence,
the claim that the macro spin direction is a relative relational property does not imply
condition (i) but only requires conditions (ii)–(iv).
The relativized relational property, however, is still in tension with the measurement
statistics. For relativizing the relational spin property would not allow for arbitrary
changes under change of measurement direction: Since spin values are quantized and
can only be up or down, a relation between them can only be “having opposite spin” or
“having equal spin”. So at any measurement direction the possible measurement results
may either be a distribution of opposite spins (|↑〉1|↓〉2 or |↓〉1|↑〉2 with some probability
each) or of equal spins (|↑〉1|↑〉2 or |↓〉1|↓〉2 with some probability each), but no mixture
of opposite and equal terms. The latter, however, is the case for the state above for most
measurement directions.
In order to allow for such a mixture of opposite and equal terms one would have to
further generalize the concept: One would need to allow for a relational property that
is a superposition (with possibly different weights) of relations that hold relative to a
spatial direction: “being in a superposition of ‘having opposite spin’ with probabilistic
weight 2p1 and of ‘having equal spin’ with probabilistic weight 1 − 2p1 relative to a
certain direction u1”. This further generalization of the concept, if a superposition of
properties makes any sense, would only require conditions (ii) and (iii) and hence be
compatible with the state (4) and its statistics. So in principle one can make states of
form (4) compatible with a generalized concept of a relational state. (Recall that I do
not defend this proposal.)
4.3 The failure of relational properties
A relational conception, however, definitely fails for the state
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where p1 is a number between 0 and 1 (representing the probability that | ↑〉1 and | ↑〉2
is measured, see Fn. 27).
While for p = 12 the state (5) reduces to the state (3), for any value p 6=
1
2 , say p = 0.2,
we get a different state that yields the following measurement statistics:
• |↑〉1 and |↑〉2 in 20% of the runs,
• |↓〉1 and |↓〉2 in 80% of the runs,
• and this statistics only holds for one measurement direction and changes for dif-
ferent directions.
This statistics again violates the rotational symmetry (i), but that point, as we have
explained, can be healed, so we leave it aside here. What is more important is that
according to the statistics the different possible outcomes are statistically unequally
distributed, violating (iii). Why would the relational property “having equal spin as”
give more statistical weight to one of the two possible outcomes than to the other? I
cannot see any plausible reason. If there is a truly irreducible relation, then it should
not prefer one combination of intrinsic micro properties over the other. Hence, such
entangled properties cannot be interpreted as relations.
If these more general ones cannot, one should not interpret the other, more specific
ones to be relations. They differ from the former just in that their weights are equally
distributed, but that symmetry can be explained by a gradual difference; there is no
reason to suppose that there is a qualitative difference here.
The upshot is that the idea to understand an entangled quantum state as describing a
relational property fails. Since the entangled state is a superposition the relational inter-
pretation would be a non-literal one anyway, providing, however, a prima facie plausible
and uniting understanding. But the more complex cases of entangled states have shown
that this way is not open. Both models of relational holism are not appropriate. What
remains is to understand the entangled state more literally as a superposition of combi-
nations of different intrinsic states, which is what monistic holism and pluralistic holism
assume.
5 For the existence of the micro objects
Besides the quantum state, which can vary over time and is described by the wave
function (including the spin component of the wave function that we have considered so
far), each quantum micro system is characterized by state-independent variables, which
are characteristic for each type of system and most centrally comprise mass and charge.
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Every type of quantum system has a specific fixed set of values for these two variables,29
e.g. each electron has the same certain mass and the same certain charge.
I shall now show that the state-independent variables provide an argument for the exis-
tence of the micro objects, and this argument comes in two steps. I first argue that mass
and charge of the micro systems play a fundamental role in the quantum mechanical
description of the macro systems that cannot be reduced to other variables, especially
not to macro variables (sections ??–5.2). I then argue that the state-independent vari-
ables describe fundamental properties requiring that the corresponding micro objects
exist (section 5.3).
5.1 The micro charges are fundamental properties
On the one hand, it is well-known that in quantum mechanics (like in classical theories)
the macro charge just is the sum of the micro charges (Q =
∑
i qi), which suggests a
reduction of the macro to the micro charges. That presupposes, however, that it makes
sense to speak of micro charges, and precisely the answer to that question is not clear in
entangled systems. If, for instance, entangled systems were undivided wholes, assuming
micro charges in order to show a reduction to the micro level, would be question begging.
So we need to consider the quantum mechanical description of an entangled macro system
and the roles that micro and macro charges play in that description.
Being coupling constant of the electromagnetic field, the role of micro and macro charges
in macro systems can be evaluated by examining the dynamical equation of macro sys-
tems with charged components. As an example consider a macro system describing two













∇22 + V (x1,x2, t)
)
Ψ(x1,x2, t), (6)
where x1 and x2 are the spatial coordinates of electron 1 and 2, respectively, Ψ is the
wave function of the macro system, m1 and m2 are the masses of electron 1 and 2,
respectively, and V is the potential describing the interactions.
Each electron is negatively charged (q1 and q2, respectively) and therefore they interact
with each other, which is described by the potential V . The most simple case that
the electrons are in a stationary state and interact with each other in a static way, is
described by the Coulomb potential
29 Spin is only state-independent for fundamental particles. Macro spin depends on the macro state
and does not supervene on the micro states. It is then a matter of controversy whether composite
systems that agree in their components (and hence in mass and charge) but differ in macro spin
are of the same kind or constitute different kinds. Some examples suggest that they belong to the
same kind but differ in state (e.g. different electronic states of an atom), other suggest that they are
different kinds of systems (e.g. nucleons and ∆-baryons).
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Non-stationary and relativistic cases are more complicated, but they all agree in the
general fact that the micro charges q1 and q2 play a central role in the description of
the macro system, while the macro charge does not appear at all in the description, not
even by its reducing paraphrase q1 +q2. Clearly, the micro charges are relevant variables
in the dynamics of the macro system, but the macro charges are not.
Then, the conclusion seems inevitable that even in entangled systems it is the micro
charges which are fundamental according to the quantum mechanical description.
5.2 The micro masses are fundamental properties
Similarly, macro mass is known to be the sum of the micro masses (M =
∑
imi), and the
crucial question again is whether micro masses are defined in entangled systems. The
system of two electrons described by equation (6) illustrates that the inertial masses m1
and m2 of the micro systems play a fundamental role, while the macro mass does not
appear in any sense.
Assuming classical gravitational theory, the same is true for gravitational masses that
can be introduced by extending (6) to the Schrödinger-Newton equation.30 Then, also
the micro masses describe fundamental variables.
5.3 The micro objects exist and carry micro mass and charge
The upshot of these considerations is that the state-independent variables micro mass
and micro charge are fundamental according to the quantum mechanical formalism. By
realism (QSR) we can then infer that each of these variables on the micro level describes
a micro property instance, and due to (EPB) each of these micro property instances
requires an object that carries it.
Which object carries the micro property instances mass and charge? On the one hand,
it is clear that the most natural scenario is to assume that they are carried by the
corresponding micro objects. On the other hand, we have seen above that the existence
of an l-level property instance does not necessarily imply the existence of an l-level
object, since macro properties can be carried by micro objects collectively. So far,
however, we have not said anything about the reverse case, which is relevant here: Can
micro properties be carried by macro objects?
Imagine the case that only a (partless, undivided) macro object exists (RMH). Could
such an object carry micro properties like masses m1 and m2? I think it is pretty clear
that it cannot. If it carried the micro property mass m1 like any other macro property
30 It is well-known that, currently, there is no generally accepted relativistic quantum theory with
gravitation.
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that it carries, m1 would have to have the same status, i.e. be a macro property. So it
needs to carry m1 in a different way than its macro properties. And what would be the
appropriate way for the macro object to carry m1 as a micro property? It would be to
carry m1 by only a part of the macro object, which contradicts the assumption of the
macro object being partless.
To illustrate the case: a white object can only have red dots on its surface, if it has parts;
if it did not have parts it would have to appear homogenous over its whole surface. (It is
hard to imagine that one could not make a red dot on it without affecting the other parts
of its surface but that is because we are used to the fact that extended objects have parts.)
Or more generally: an object can only be structured, i.e. instantiate different properties
of the same kind, if it has parts.31 The required parts may depend ontologically on the
whole (or vice versa), but I emphasize that it does not help if the parts only existed
reductively, for then they would not be able to carry the micro property instance that
exists non-reductively.
If these considerations are correct, we have found an asymmetry between micro and
macro properties. While we have seen above that a macro property can be borne either
by a macro object or by several micro objects collectively (MaPB), we here find:
(MiPB) Micro property bearing: A micro property cannot be borne by a macro
object, but only by a micro object.
Consequently, the micro property instances of mass and charge can only be carried by the
corresponding micro objects, and since any quantum macro system, including entangled
systems, involves these properties, for any quantum system the micro objects exist and
carry the micro properties mass and charge.
This might seem to stand in a certain tension with the holistic character of entangled
systems, but our models reveal that it is in fact consistent with most of the models; only
model RMH is ruled out. The latter might seem surprising since to regard entangled
systems as describing undivided wholes has been a favourite model for many. The lesson
here is that quantum holism is not blunt. It seems much more subtle and differentiated
than many seem to have assumed.
6 Against the existence of the macro object
6.1 The argument from duplication (of macro mass and macro charge)
This argument concerns the relation between the micro and macro level of the reducible
state-independent properties mass and charge. We here present the argument for the
property mass (and the argument for charge runs mutatis mutandis). We have already
said that the property macro mass clearly reduces to the sum of the micro masses.
Furthermore, we have said that the micro objects exist and carry the state-independent
31 Spinoza would probably object to this point: the partless substance, God, can have restricted modes.
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micro properties (section 5). So one can easily paraphrase talk about “macro mass” as
in fact meaning “the sum of the micro masses”. Then, there is no need to assume that
instances of macro mass exist (and neither that instances of macro charge exist), and
the principle of parsimony requires that one should not assume their existence.
This leads to problems for models that assume the existence of the macro object. Recall
that by exist we mean non-reductive existence, so especially an existing macro object
cannot be identical to the micro objects. Then, to claim the existence of a macro object
is to claim the existence of a full, distinct material object, and consequently that macro
object needs to carry all properties that a material object carries, especially the state-
independent properties mass and charge. Hence, to claim the existence of the macro
object is to claim the existence of instances of the state-independent macro properties
and these properties are distinct from the micro properties. Then it would be the
case that, e.g., both the micro masses and the macro mass exist, although the latter is
reducible to the former.
This yields two problems. First, there are now two candidates for the referent of “macro
mass” and it is unclear to which entity the term “macro mass” refers: to the fundamental
property of the macro object or to the property that supervenes on the micro masses?
And if to the one, what about the other? Inconsistencies lurk. Second, having a fun-
damental property macro mass although macro mass supervenes on the micro masses
violates the principle of parsimony.
6.2 The argument from causal irrelevance (of macro mass and macro
charge)
We have just argued that assuming the existence of the macro object implies the existence
of the properties macro mass and macro charge. Besides being in tension with super-
vening macro mass and charge, their existence comes with a further problem: Macro
mass and macro charge are not causally relevant according to the quantum mechanical
formalism; any reasonable inductive metaphysics, however, is committed to the principle
that one should only assume properties that are causally relevant. Hence, since macro
mass and charge are not causally relevant, one should not assume the existence of the
macro object.
We should be clear about the causal irrelevance of the properties, and demonstrate
explicitly that they play no causal role. There are two senses in which they might be
effective: either as acting downwards on the micro properties or as acting on other macro
properties. I shall examine these questions for the case of the property macro charge.
Starting with possible downwards causal roles of macro charge, we consider again the
system of two electrons interacting in a static way (eq. equation (6) and equation (7)).
We have seen that the micro charges q1 and q2 prominently figure in the dynamical
equation via the Coulomb potential. Nowhere, however, do we find a macro charge Q
or the sum of the micro charges q1 + q2 (which equals the macro charge). The same is
also true for more complex electromagnetic potentials which always involve the micro
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charges and never the macro charge in the most detailed description.32 So the macro
charge does not play any causal role when the macro system is left to itself, not to speak
of downwards causation.
What about the causal relevance of macro charge in situations in which the macro
systems interacts with other macro systems? We consider the most simple case that the
system with two electrons is subject to an external static electric potential due to an
external charge q3, e.g. due to a Helium nucleus. Does the property macro charge play
any role in such situations? The quantum mechanical way of describing such situations
is to add the external potential to the internal potential, so the total potential reads:














One can see that also in this case there is no macro charge involved. The relevant new
terms in the potential (the latter two summands) each contains a product of a micro
charge with the external charge, suggesting that each micro charge interacts with the
external charge.
In sum, there is no doubt: It is the micro charges that are causally relevant while the
macro charge does not play any relevant causal role. A similar claim is true of macro
mass.
So we have found two arguments for the case that the macro object does not exist; this
excludes the moderate models.
7 The proposed model
We have finally arrived at a unique result. In order to narrow down the possible models
for the mereology of entangled quantum systems (figure 1), I have presented four main
arguments. The argument against a relational entangled property excludes both models
of relational holism (RRH, MRH); the argument for the existence of the micro objects
rules out radical monistic holism (RMH), i.e. undivided wholes; and the two arguments
against the existence of the macro object (given that the micro objects exist) speaks
against any of the moderate models (MMH, MRH, MPH). In sum, my considerations
rule out five of the six models, yielding the conclusion that only the model radical
pluralistic holism (RPH) withstands the objections.
While Bohn’s and Brenner’s proposals of plural properties have shown that one cannot
infer without further arguments from the existence of an irreducible l-level property to
32 This is not to say, however, that there are no systems that can appropriately be described by a macro
charge. For instance, when point charges are symmetrically arranged on the surface of a sphere, the
macro system can be described as a point charge that equals the sum of the micro charges in the
center of the sphere. In such cases, however, the macro charge still is the result of a summation of
the micro charges and provides a more convenient summarizing description.
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the existence of the corresponding object (since the l-level property might be carried
collectively by the l − 1-level objects), here I have provided explicit arguments against
such an inference in the case of entangled systems. More precisely, it is Bohn’s proposal of
regarding the entangled property as a non-relational plural property that my arguments
based on the quantum mechanical evidence support.
By the results of the foregoing investigation the more detailed picture of the proposed
model RPH is as follows: There is no macro object. The micro objects exist and carry
the state-independent micro properties mass and charge. Macro mass and macro charge
supervene on these micro masses and micro charges, respectively; in this way there is no
duplication of the state independent macro properties. The non-relational macro spin
property is carried collectively by the micro objects. It is described by the entangled
quantum state and does not supervene on the micro level.
One might object that the micro objects, if they exist, need to carry the complete set
of properties that material objects usually carry: mass, charge and spin; and since
their spin is not well-defined, they fail to conform to the condition. While I agree with
the condition, I would not say that the micro objects fail to have a spin property: It
is true that they do not have a separable singular spin property, but they collectively
carry a non-separable macro spin property, which determines (the probabilities of) their
individual spin behaviour.
This consideration suggests the following picture: Each quantum object only has one
fundamental spin property that determines its spin behaviour: either it carries a well-
defined micro spin property (and the macro spin state is described by a supervening
product state) or, jointly with other quantum objects, it collectively carries a funda-
mental macro spin property (and its micro spin property is either not well-defined or is
reducible to that macro property, depending on whether one assumes RV oder SOV).
In this way, since only one level (both for objects and properties) is fundamental one
avoids duplication of properties or causal conflicts between them.
Recall that the micro objects in the models and a forteriori in the proposed model RPH
are either non-individuals or objects with weak identity. It has not been the task to decide
between the two variants here (which is the individuational problem of entanglement),
but I have taken care to symmetrize the models (as quantum mechanics does) in order
to stay as neutral as possible concerning this further question.
To say that there is no macro object according to the proposed model RPH, of course
means that the macro object does not exist fundamentally or dependently, which is
compatible with the fact that the macro object exists reductively. “The macro object
has an entangled spin property” can be paraphrased as “the micro objects collectively
carry an entangled spin macro property”. “Macro object” then in fact refers to the micro
objects and “singular macro property” in fact to a plural macro property.
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8 Discussion
(1) It might appear surprising that radical pluralistic holism comes out as the survivor
of the selection process, since quantum entanglement has often been associated with
holism and seems to underline the importance of the macro system. The arguments
above, however, have differentiated between holistic properties and holistic objects, and
while quantum mechanics clearly involves the former, the arguments show that it likely
does not involve the latter.
Furthermore, the idea of a non-relational plural property might seem unusual. The
reason seems to be that plural logic and its entailments have only started to become as
widespread as they deserve to be. There is nothing wrong with collective properties, in
fact, as I have argued with my example of temperature and others, we have ever been
using them in our descriptions.
It is remarkable that exactly the proposal of a non-relational plural property allows to
deal with the balancing act dictated by the arguments: On the one hand, there are good
arguments against the existence of the macro object, so the entangled property must
be carried by the micro objects collectively; on the other hand, the entangled property
may not be a relation; hence the entangled property should be a non-relational plural
property as RPH postulates.
(2) Since my arguments lead to a denial of composition in entangled quantum systems,
I emphasize that they do not establish that mereological nihilism holds, since nihilism
requires the absence of (non-trivial) composition for all kinds of systems. In this sense,
I have not even attempted at answering the special composition question; my aim just
was to find the appropriate mereological model for entangled quantum systems.
Nevertheless, it might be true that my result, if correct, has the potential to shake the
trust in theories that assume composition, since entanglement has been regarded by many
as one of the most secure cases of composition: If the non-separable states of entangled
systems do not imply composition, what else should? However, in fact my result is also
compatible with moderate compositionalism, which assumes that composition occurs in
circumstances other than entanglement (say, due to life, Inwagen 1990).
I may add that my result is incompatible with universalism. To be fair, the principles
which I have used in order to derive consequences from quantum mechanics, are designed
to establish a parsimonious and as far as possible reductive metaphysics, thus principles
that a universalist probably would not accept anyway.
(3) It is not only that my scope is much more narrow than the special composition
question; in this paper I have neither attempted to examine the conditions under which
composition occurs. Rather, I have considered possible models and have discussed which
of them is in accordance with the empirical evidence and which is not. This procedure
might appropriately be called “mereological modelling”. The fact that entanglement is
not a condition under which composition occurs can only be read off the final result of
the modelling.
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(4) Trying to answer a metaphysical question by pointing to empirical evidence from
one of our best scientific theory, this paper stands in the tradition of what has his-
torically been called “inductive metaphysics” (Scholz, 2018). Inductive metaphysics is
now practiced by many contemporary metaphysicians who base arguments as much as
possible on scientific evidence rather than on intuitions. On hte other hand, inductive
metaphysics contrasts with naturalistic metaphysics by assuming that metaphysics is a
separate discipline from fundamental physics with its own methods and questions (En-
gelhard et al., 2021). Especially, in this paper we have seen that the physical formalism
does not by itself provide the metaphysical results; rather they need to be derived by
suitable principles and arguments.
(5) While the taxonomy of six mereological models is general in that it spans the space
of possible models for a system with an irreducible property, my arguments for RPH
are not. My arguments rely on the specific description that the quantum mechanical
formalism provides for entangled systems, and cannot be generalized to other systems.
(6) Still, my arguments might have implications for entangled quantum systems beyond
the specific mereological aim of this paper. Especially the argument in section 4 provides
an objection to all interpretations of quantum theory that assume entangled quantum
states to describe relational properties.
One position that seems to be challenged by this argument is ontic structural realism,
which claims that the fundamental elements of reality are structure, i.e. relational
properties. Entangled quantum systems understood relationally are typically cited as a
major evidence for the view that relations rather than objects are fundamental entities
(Esfeld, 2004; Ladyman et al., 2007; French, 2014). If, in contrast, irreducible entangled
quantum states cannot be interpreted relationally, how would OSR describe them?
(7) Finally, it is a remarkable fact that the quantum mechanical description provides
enough evidence to rule out all but one model, especially since the arguments have been
relatively simple and the assumed principles relatively weak. It is not often the case
in metaphysics, where underdetermination is the rule, that one so fortunately receives
support from an empirically confirmed theory.
The clear result suggests that it is not correct to claim that scientific theories are mere-
ologically neutral in the sense that they do not favor any mereological model. At least
when one assumes a realistic reading of the theory jointly with some relatively weak
metaphysical principles like the (EPB), surprisingly far-reaching consequences can be
drawn. Neither does it seem true in the light of the result that mereology has no empir-
ical content: the arguments in this paper demonstrate that certain empirical facts speak
against certain mereological models — which is exactly what empirical content means.
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